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POLITICAL RESTRAINTS ON
EAST-WEST TRADE

East-West Trade Regulation in the United States
(1974 Trade Act, Title IV)
by Kazimierz Grzybowski*
I. General Survey
In the long history of United States foreign trade legislation, the
1974 Trade Act' marked a turning point in shaping American policies
regarding economic cooperation with the outside world. In this respect
2
it may be compared to its predecessor, the 1934 Trade Agreements Act,
which sought to save the American economy from the economic depression of the 1930's. In 1934 bilateral trade agreements were intended to
open new markets to American exports in order to stimulate employment, production and investment. In 1974 the basic purpose was still the
same.
There are other analogies which come to mind. Both the 1934 and
1974 legislation came into being after protectionist policies demonstrated their futility. Both were preceded by a public discussion
demonstrating that free trade partisans were in the ascendance.
Here, however, similarities end. The 1934 Trade Agreements Act
saw a solution in the negotiation of bilateral trade agreements, while the
1974 Trade Act addressed itself to the development of open and nondiscriminatory world trade. The principal mechanism proposed for the
realization of this goal was the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
[GATT], which was to be given new responsibilities and functions
beyond those which it had exercised since its formation in 1947. The
*Professor of Law, Duke University.
'Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2487 (Supp. V 1975)..
2
Trade Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 73-316, ch. 474, 48 Stat. 943 (1934) (current
version at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1351-1354 (1970) ).
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1934 Act approached trade liberalization on a state to state basis, while
the 1974 Act envisaged United States trade policies as addressed to the
international community as a whole.
This approach forced Congress to distinguish between the different
groups of which the international community consists, according to
economic structure and level of development. The 1974 Trade Act addressed itself to three classes of United States trading partners: Western
industrialized market economies, less developed countries, and nonmarket economy (socialist) countries, which are the subject of this'
essay.
Under the United States Constitution, Congress has power "To
lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts. . ." and "To regulate Commerce
with foreign nations... . -3 Therefore any concession either as

regards the lowering of tariffs or regulation of trade requires either
prior or consequent approval of Congress, even if part of an international trade agreement. Beginning with the 1934 Trade Agreements
Act, U.S. trade legislation has also included authorization for the
Executive branch to negotiate trade agreements with foreign countries,
in order to reach a regime of trade relations essentially meeting the
standards set up by the Congress. The drafting of these standards has
typically occasioned considerable controversy, and the 1974 Act
proved to be no exception.
II. The New Approach
As regards trade with the socialist countries, the relevant phrase
stating the purpose of the 1974 Act is as follows: "through trade
agreements affording mutual benefits... to open up market opportunities for United States commerce in nonmarket economies; ....-4
When compared with the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, this phrase
illustrates a major policy shift. The 1962 Act authorized the President to
negotiate tariff concessions in the so-called Kennedy Round, where one
of the purposes was "to prevent Communist Economic penetration." 5
The tenor of the 1974 Act is thus markedly different from the earlier
legislation, and suggests a basic reversal of policies followed prior to its
enactment. In effect, the aim of the 1974 Act is to remake the system of
trade controls which until quite recently was designed to restrain, rather
than to expand, trade with the socialist bloc.
Title IV of the 1974 Trade Act, "Trade Relations With Countries Not
Currently Receiving Nondiscriminatory Treatment," regulates United
States participation in East-West trade. Its original plan was comparatively simple. The bill submitted to the Congress by the Nixon Ad3U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1,3.
419 U.S.C. § 2102(5) (Supp. V 1975).
5

Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 19 U.S.C. § 1801(3) (1970).
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ministration in March, 1973 upheld the general reservation that mostfavored nation [MFN] treatment should not be extended to communist
countries except when it is in the national interest. Under the original
plan, a communist country could be given MFN status either through a
bilateral or multilateral (i.e., GATT) trade agreement. New commercial
agreements were to be made for periods not exceeding three years, and
could be renewed for three additional years, provided that a satisfactory
trade balance had been maintained and that reductions in trade barriers
by the United States had been reciprocated by the other party. Import
relief provisions followed procedures analogous to those applicable to
trade with market economy countries. In general, the scheme of the Act
was to normalize the East-West trade regime following world trade
6
practices, and to avoid exceptions from general rules.
The adopted Act differed profoundly from the initial plan. In the
opinion of the Congress, the integration of the socialist countries into
the world trade system calls for concessions, which though not of an
economic nature, nevertheless signify a greater compliance with the
practices of democratic government. Before admitting socialist countries to the benefits of United States economic cooperation, including
credits, credit guarantees, insurance and investment guarantees, Congress also insisted on settling claims for Lend-Lease and the nationalization of U.S. property. Finally, it felt that an East-West trade regime
must provide for safeguards to protect the economy of the United States
from the concentration of economic power in the hands of socialist
governments.
Proponents of the liberalization of East-West trade, including
many American corporations doing business in the East and the State
Department, favored unrestricted extension of MFN status. They
stated that the world has reached a point where economic interdependence is the norm. According to them, MFN status would bring about a
normalization of trade relations with these countries and ultimately
lead to a more stable world order. Conditioning trade upon political
constraints was seen as meddling in the internal affairs of sovereign
nations, and as a practice potentially detrimental to detente. In the
words of then Secretary of State Kissinger, when he addressed the
Senate Finance Committee:
Detente as we see it, is not rooted in agreement of values; it
becomes above all necessary because each side recognizes that the
other is a potential adversary in a nuclear war. To us, detente is a
process of managing relations with a potentially hostile country in
order to preserve peace while maintaining our vital interests. In a
nuclear age this is, in itself, an objective not without moral
validity-it may, indeed, be the most profound imperative of all.

619

U.S.C. §§ 2431-2441 (1970).
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Detente is found in a frank recognition of basic differences.
Precisely because we are conscious that these differences exist, we
have sought to channel our relations, with the U.S.S.R. into a
more stable framework-a structure of interrelated and interdependent agreements. Forward movement in our relations should
be on a broad front so that groups and individuals in both countries will have a vested interest in the maintenance
of peace and
7
growth of a stable international world order.

American corporations argued that the unrestricted granting of
MFN treatment to nonmarket countries would open up a vast new
market which had been sorely neglected in the past. Mr. Eugene Moss,
President of the Board of Directors of the East-West Trade Council
stated:
The U.S.S.R. and other East European countries, for example, in
1971, did $20 billion worth of trade with the Western nations and
Japan. That was more than 30 times the U.S. trade with the
socialist countries. The total U.S. trade with Eastern European
countries, excluding the U.S.S.R., in 1971 was only 5% of those
countries' total trade with the West. 8
The reason for the low trade percentage was that American producers
could not compete with the other Western nations who were extending
much needed government credits and investment guarantees to the
socialist countries. The nonmarket nations need MFN treatment because they are traditionally short of foreign currency, due to the fact
that their imports usually exceed exports. Upon extension of MFN
treatment, the corporate spokesmen reasoned, American goods would
finally be able to compete effectively for this market. The socialists
would be able to buy from us, because they would find it profitable to
sell to us. It was pointed out that in this even trade situation, American
goods might be able to take market-share from other Western competitors, as American technology and machinery are held in the highest regard in the East. 9
III. Growth of the East-West Trade Regulations
The course of United States trade with socialist countries has a
considerable history. Since the recognition of the Soviet Union and the
"Gentlemen's Agreement" of November 16, 1933,10 the United States
7
Hearings on H. R. 10710 Before the Senate Finance Committee, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
454 (1974) (statement of Sec. of State Henry A. Kissinger).
8
Hearings on H. R. 10710 Before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. 3517 (1973) (statement of Eugene Moss).
9Id.
t0
The Litvinoff Agreement, Nov. 16, 1933, United States-Russia, U.S. DEP'T OF

STATE, EASTERN EUROPEAN SERIES, No. 1 (1933).
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has treated trade with Russia as a component of its foreign policy. For
instance, the United States-Soviet Commercial Relations Agreement of
July 13, 1935 became a casualty of the cold war in 1951. Following
conversion of a number of the East European countries into Soviet
satellites, the United States responded to the expansion of Soviet power
by restricting trade with socialist countries in a manner clearly resembling war-time measures. 1
An important component of these restrictions was the Trading with
the Enemy Act of 1917,12 which provided a workable basis for controlling economic cooperation with the socialist countries. Similarly, the
Johnson Debt Default Act of 1934,13 which prohibited private persons
from engaging in certain financial transactions involving foreign governments which were in default of their obligations to the United States,
was also used as an instrument for restricting trade with socialist countries.
Pursuant to the Trading with the Enemy Act, the Treasury Department issued Transaction Control Regulations. 14 They authorize the
scrutiny and licensing of all exports to communist countries according to
classes of goods and to the country to which the delivery is to be made.
The power to license such exports is shared by the Treasury and Commerce Departments; in practice, so as to avoid conflicts over authority,
the Treasury Department automatically confirms export licenses ap5
proved by the Commerce Department.'
The most important legislation specifically designed to impose controls on trade with communist nations was the Export Control Act of
1949,16 which was replaced twenty years later by the Export Administration Act of 1969.' 7 The export control mechanisms of these Acts are
administered by the Office of Export Control of the Bureau of International Commerce of the Department of Commerce. The Office has compiled a Commodity Control List, which by an ingenious method permits
the regulatory agency to control the flow of exports in support of United
States foreign policy. The Commodity Control List classifies, according
to a code letter, each commodity requiring an export license from the
Office of Export Control. Correspondingly, each country to which
American exports may be directed is grouped in one of eight categories
according to another classification system designated by the letters from
Q to Z. Thus, the resultant combination of two letters indicates which
commodities going to certain destinations will require an export license.
"See Grzybowski, United States-Soviet Union Trade Agreement of 1972, in EAST-WEST
TRADE

3 (1973).

1250 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-44 (1970).
1318 U.S.C. § 955 (1970).
1431 C.F.R. §§ 505.01-.60 (1976).

"5d. § 500.533(a)(1).
16Export Control Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-11, ch. 11, 63 Stat. 7 (1949).
1750 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2413 (1970) (amended 1972 & 1974).

6

N.C.J. INT'L L. & COMM. REG.

Commodities listed under category "A" require an export license for all
destinations, while all countries in group "Z" require export licenses for
all classes of goods.
In 1969 the Export Administration Act 18 revised the policies which
the export controls were designed to serve. The 1949 Act had been
intended to prevent any distribution of commodities abroad which
would be of significant detriment to the military or economic well-being
of the United States. While the 1969 Act retained the entire mechanism
of controls and regulations governing the licensing of exports, it modified significantly the overall purpose of trade restrictions. Absolute
prohibition of exports was limited only to those items which would
make a "significant contribution to the military potential" of the country
of destination. 19 In addition, the 1969 Act was no longer specifically
oriented against communist-dominated nations.
The Export Administration Act of 1969 was the result of a growing
conviction that the 1949 Act had failed to achieve its purpose. The Soviet
Union and the People's Republic of China [P.R.C.] had forged ahead
with programs of economic and military development. The 1949 Act had
merely diverted socialist trade from the United States to other countries
that followed a less restrictive policy. Therefore, the 1969 Act eliminated
the requirement that American commodities or technological data must
not contribute to the economic potential of the country of destination.
Moreover, the criterion of availability was promulgated as a basis for
licensing the export of a commodity or technology to a communist
country included on the Commodity Control List. Undoubtedly, an
important consideration bearing on this liberalizing trend in export
controls was the need to improve our balance of payments.
Originally, the system of controls included all communist countries
except Yugoslavia. Nondiscriminatory treatment was denied to other
countries of the Soviet bloc on the basis of the 1951 Trade Agreements
Extension Act, which required withdrawal of all concessions granted to
the Soviet Union and "any nation or area dominated or controlled by the
foreign government or foreign organization controlling the world communist movement."'2 0 Pursuant to the Act, the President suspended
21
trade concessions to all communist countries other than Yugoslavia.
Yugoslavia was exempted in spite of her undoubtedly communist government, due to her independent position vis-a-vis the Soviet bloc since
the Soviet-Yugoslav dispute in 1948.
American trade relations with the socialist East were further complicated when some socialist countries became members of the GATT.
18

d.

9

1 1d. § 2402(1).
20

Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-50, ch. 141, § 5, 65 Stat.
73 (1951) (repealed 1962).
21
Pres. Procl. No. 2935, 3 C.F.R. 121 (1958).
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There were no difficulties with Poland and Yugoslavia, members of the
GATT since 1967 and 1966 respectively. Nondiscriminatory treatment
was already accorded to Yugoslavia, and Most Favored Nation status
was extended to Poland in 1969, following the presidential determination that it was no longer dominated or controlled by the Soviet
Union. 22 However, when Romania (1971) and Hungary (1973) joined
the GATT and Bulgaria was granted observer status (1975), the United
States refused to extend MFN treatment on the ground of Article XXXV
23
of the GATT (Avoidance of GATT provisions).
A different case was that of Czechoslovakia, an original member of
the GATT (1947) and as such, entitled to MFN treatment. In this instance
the denial of MFN treatment to Czechoslovak exports was based on
24
Article XXI (national security grounds) of the GATT.
Two more developments in the area of East-West trade must be
described, both of which preceded the enactment of the 1974 Trade Act.
The first is the case of the People's Republic of China. 25 Following the
communist take-over in 1949, the United States government issued a list
of prohibited commodities and effected a partial embargo. In December,
1950 a total prohibition of trade with China was ordered.
On June 10, 1971 controls on a long list of nonstrategic U.S. exports
to the People's Republic of China were terminated 26 in accordance with
the provisions of the Export Administration Act of 1969, as amended by
the Equal Export Opportunity Act of 1972.27 Though this inaugurated a
new era in Sino-American trade relations, the move did not arrive
unheralded. It had been preceded by modification of restrictions on the
travel of U.S. citizens to China, permission for American tourists to
import Chinese goods for noncommercial purposes, 28 and allowance of
trade in nonstrategic goods by United States firms abroad, provided that
U.S. dollars were not used in the transactions. 2 9 In addition,
nonstrategic foreign-made products incorporating U.S.-produced
components and parts had been authorized for sale and shipment to the
P.R.C. in April, 1970, subject only to obtaining an export license in each
case. 30 The following August, bunkering of free world ships carrying
22

See generally Bilder, East-West Trade Boycotts: A Study in Private, Labor Union, State
and Local
Interference with Foreign Policy, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 841-938 (1970).
23
GAT, Oct. 30, 1947, art. XXXV, 61 Stat. (5), (6), T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S.
188.
4
2 1d. art. XXI; K. DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 316 (1970); See J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF THE GATT 749-51 (1969).
25
See Grzybowski, Control of U.S. Trade with China: An Overview, 38 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 175 (1973).
26
For a summary of those lists, see 64 DEP'T STATE BULL. 815 (1971); a more detailed

listing may be found in 36 Fed. Reg. 11,808 (1971).
2750 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2413 (1970), as amended by Equal Export Opportunity Act,
Pub. L. No. 92-412, 86 Stat. 644 (1972).
2834 Fed. Reg. 12,179 (1969).
291d.
3oU.S. OFFICE OF EXPORT CONTROL, DEP'T OF COMMERCE BULL. No. 16 (1970).
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nonstrategic goods to the P.R.C. with petroleum products of non-U.S.
origin was permitted. 3 1 Finally, on April 4, 1971, President Nixon announced further ameliorations in travel and trade restrictions: visas for
visitors from China were to be expedited; United States currency controls were to be relaxed to permit the use of dollars in trade with the
P.R.C.; American vessels and planes were to be allowed to carry
Chinese cargoes between non-Chinese ports; U.S. firms were to be
permitted to fuel Chinese ships and aircraft (except those bound to and
from North Vietnam, North Korea, or Cuba); and U.S.-owned foreign
32
flag carriers were to be permitted to call at Chinese ports.
The rationale behind these various steps was to modify the regime
of China trade regulations in accordance both with changes taking place
in other countries and with changing attitudes in the United States
itself. The most significant domestic factor was the armistice in South
Vietnam which permitted the disengagement and withdrawal of American forces from that country. At least in part, the armistice had to be
credited to China's policy of reducing tensions with the United States.
After the June 10, 1971 announcement removed the need for
special export licenses for goods and commodities excluded from the
list, items included on the list could still be exported under the
condition that a special license be obtained in accordance with the
export control regulations, subject only to the general provisions
safeguarding American national security. Moreover, under the general
license provisions, all imports from China were allowed entry into the
United States subject only to the usual controls and customs duties
relating to goods originating in communist countries. The P.R.C. was
also included in the June 10, 1971 termination of the requirement that
fifty per cent of wheat, flour, and other grain exports be carried in
American bottoms. 33 The June announcement was complemented by
that of February 14, 1972, which placed the P.R.C. in country group
"Y" on the Commodity Control List of the Department of Commerce,
finally elevating China to the same status as accorded the Soviet
34
Union.
The second case is that of the Soviet Union. In 1972 the United
States government, following the policy of detente, concluded with the
Soviet Union a trade agreement which gave the U.S.S.R. MFN status.
The agreement came up for ratification in the course of the debate on
the 1974 Trade Act.

31

Letter from U.S. Dep't of Treasury to interested firm (Aug. 26, 1970).
Statement by the President Announcing Changes in U.S. Trade and Travel
Restrictions, 7 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 628 (April 14, 1971).
33
See 64 DEP'T STATE BULL. 815 (1971).
3437 Fed. Reg. 3511 (1972).
32

EAST-WEST TRADE REGULATION
IV. The

Most Favored Nation
35
Treatment-Clause

[MFN]-Nondiscriminatory

The main reason for the change of Congressional attitude toward
trade with the socialist East was the awareness that the United States
share of that trade was growing at a slower rate than that of the rest of
the world. In 1973 it was still below 10% of the total. At the same time
Congress felt it unwise to grant MFN status to any socialist country
without requiring certain basic preconditions. 36 The following sections
discuss those conditions.
a. Freedom of Emigration - The Cases of the Soviet Union and Romania
Section 402 of the 1974 Trade Act, which originated as the
Jackson-Vanik Amendment, requires that the products of a nonmarket
country (with the exceptions of Poland and Yugoslavia) be ineligible
for nondiscriminatory treatment during any period in which the President determines that the country denies its citizens the right or
opportunity to emigrate, or imposes more than nominal charges on
emigration. The section also bars such countries from participating in
any U.S. program that extends credits, credit guarantees, or investment guarantees (Export-Import Bank and Commodity Credit Corpo37
ration).
One way around this difficulty is a finding by the President that
such practices have ceased, and in such a case a commercial agreement
granting MFN status becomes a possibility (Section 402(a) and (b)).
Alternatively, the President may waive by Executive Order the application of Section 402(a) and (b) should a countr involved give proper
assurances as to its emigration policies, and should the President find
that granting of MFN status would promote the objectives of the Act
(Section 402(c)). The final decision to extend a waiver belongs to
Congress, which must approve any commercial agreements granting
MFN status to the country which has properly adjusted its emigration
policies (Section 402(d)).
The provisions of Section 402 were directly linked to the Administration's efforts to regularize trade relations with the Soviet Union on
the basis of the 1972 Trade Agreement, which, inter alia, guaranteed
Export-Import Bank credits for U.S. exports. Soviet emigration policies
and the harassment of Soviet Jews wishing to emigrate made congressional approval of the Soviet trade agreement unlikely unless proper
3sThe products granted the MFN status country (nondiscriminatory treatment)
are imported into the United States under column 1 duty rates which are the result of
the tariff reductions negotiated in trade agreements (bi- and multilateral) with foreign
countries. Column 2 are the high 1930 Act tariff rates which are levied on all imports
from the non-MFN countries.
36S. REP. No. 93-1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 7186.
3719 U.S.C. § 2432(a) (1970).
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guarantees were offered. This led to an exchange of letters between the
Secretary of State and Senator Jackson. The Secretary assured Senator
Jackson that the Soviet Union had discontinued its restrictive emigration policies and that harassment of persons wishing to emigrate
would cease. In his letter Senator Jackson set forth a figure of 60,000
emigrants a year as an acceptable minimum. The Soviet Union refused,
however, to tolerate this interference in its internal policies, and did
38
not ratify the Trade Agreement.
In contrast with the Soviet Union, Romania was granted MFN
status by presidential determination, because of her emigration policy
39
and her independent foreign and trade policy.
b. Compensation for Nationalized Property and Defaulted Debts-The
Case of Czechoslovakia
After Czechoslovakia became a communist country, it expropriated the assets of United States nationals. All efforts to obtain
adequate compensation, estimated at some 105 million dollars inclusive of interest, were in vain. In retaliation, the United States seized
Czechoslovak assets located in the United States. As a member of the
Tripartite Commission for the Restitution of Monetary Gold established under the Paris Reparations Commission, it objected to the
return of Czechoslovak gold until Czechoslovakia agreed to reimburse
American nationals. In July, 1974, the United States and Czechoslovakia
initialled a settlement agreement in Prague which provided for the
payment by Czechoslovakia of twenty million dollars, to be paid in twelve
yearly installments in full satisfaction of American claims. In
return, the United States was to release the frozen Czechoslovak assets
and gold. Congress refused to accept this arrangement, and stipulated
in the Trade Act that the settlement must be renegotiated, suggesting
that Czechoslovakia must pay immediately at least the principal
40
amount of sixty-four million dollars.
c. Settlement of Lend-Lease Claims (Section 404)
Section 404 imposes a third condition, effective settlement of
outstanding debts. Nondiscriminatory treatment granted pursuant to
the terms of a bilateral commercial agreement can be continued so long
as the nonmarket country is fulfilling its obligations under any LendLease settlement agreement. However, the President is authorized to
41
withdraw nondiscriminatory treatment at any time.
38[1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7186, 7335; see Grzybowski, supra note 11.
39Cf. Presidential Determination No. 77-14, [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
1495 and Presidential Determination No. 76-17, [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2159, regarding MFN status for Romania. Prior to this determination, the provisions
of subsections (a) and (b) of section 402 (19 U.S.C. § 2432 (1970) ) with respect to
Romania were waived by President Ford, acting pursuant to subsection (c)(1). Exec.
Order No. 11,854, 40 Fed. Reg. 18,391 (1976).
40
Lillich, The Gravel Amendment to the Trade Reform Act of 1974: Congress Checkmates
a Presidential Lump Sum Agreement, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 837 (1975).
41See 67 DEP'T STATE BULL. 603 (1972); [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7186,
7346-48.
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Among the nonmarket countries, the Soviet Union has been a
major recipient of Lend-Lease assistance. Concurrent with the 1972
Trade Agreement, the Soviet Union agreed to settle American claims in
this connection, conditioning the payment of the fourth and all subsequent installments upon the extension of nondiscriminatory treatment to Soviet products. When the ratification of the 1972 Agreement
was abandoned, the Lend-Lease settlement also fell through.
d. Personnel Missing in Action in Southeast Asia (Section 403)
Nonmarket economy countries must also cooperate with the United States to account for American personnel missing in action in
Southeast Asia, to repatriate the living, and to return the remains of
the dead. Section 403 of the Act provides that the President may
revoke or refuse to extend MFN treatment to any country refusing to
cooperate. This section was inserted due to the reluctance of the
Vietnamese authorities to assist in locating missing Americans.
V. The Content of Trade Agreements with Socialist Countries
The bill submitted to Congress provided that nondiscriminatory
treatment may be extended to any country which has concluded a
bilateral trade agreement with the United States or has become a party
to an appropriate multilateral trade agreement to which the United
States is also a party. This provision was deleted in the House of
Representatives, so the policy that joining the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade will not automatically give a socialist country MFN
status is still in force. In its final form, the Trade Act of 1974 combined
authorization to the President to enter into bilateral trade
agreements with the nonmarket countries, with an obligation for him
to include in such agreements certain stipulations.
The duration of any agreements should not exceed three years.
They may be renewable for additional three-year periods, provided
that a balance of advantages is maintained. Agreements should provide for termination on national security grounds. They should provide for immediate consultations in case of market disruption due to
imports, and should authorize the parties to adopt import restrictions
necessary to prevent a market disruption. Agreements should protect
the industrial property and copyrights of American nationals, particularly when the other party is not a signatory of the Paris Convention for
the Protection of Industrial Property, 42 or the Universal Copyright
Convention. 43 The same requirements also apply to earlier commercial
agreements coming up for renewal. Agreements should provide for
the settlement of commercial differences and disputes, as well as
42

July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, T.I.A.S. No. 6923 (as revised 1970).
September 6, 1952, 25 U.S.T. 1341, T.I.A.S. No. 7868 (as revised 1974), 216
U.N.T.S. 133.
43
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facilitate the activities and travel of business and governmental commercial representatives seeking to promote trade. They should also
provide for periodic consultation between the parties regarding the
operation of the agreement and relevant aspects of relations between
the United States and the other party.
VI. The Safeguards
United States legislators were keenly aware that trade with
socialist countries calls for the use of special techniques of control and
supervision. As the Senate reports stated, the Senate Finance Committee recognized that a communist country, through its control of the
distribution process and the prices at which articles are sold, could
disrupt the domestic markets of its trading partners, and thereby injure
producers in those countries. In this regard the Committee took into
account the problems which East-West trade poses for certain sectors
of the American economy. When Canada provided MFN status to
communist bloc countries in the 1960's, low-priced East European
clock imports increased dramatically, to the point that sales of such
imports surpassed those of domestic producers. In the face of such
imports, traditional unfair trade remedies, such as those provided
under the Anti-Dumping Act, have proved inappropriate or ineffective
because of the difficulty of their application to products from state44
controlled economies.

In addition, the Committee was concerned that in event of the
removal of all barriers to East-West trade, the United States economy
might become dependent upon communist suppliers of raw materials
essential for American industries, with communist nations displacing
traditional suppliers. This fear was particularly strong with regard to
defense industries. The Committee was persuaded that "[o]ur traditional dependable suppliers of such materials should be given reasonable assurances that they will be able to compete in our market under
fair trade conditions without facing the threat of periodic dumping or
other disruptive sales practices." 4 5 The Committee believed that such a
traditional supplier should have the right to petition the International
Trade Commission along with American interests, in order to initiate
action preventing market disruption. 46 The Act protects the interests of
the United States, its manufacturers, and its traditional suppliers by
stricter monitoring requirements for trade with communist countries,
as well as by changes in market disruption procedures.
Section 410 requires the International Trade Commission to
monitor East-West trade, coordinating its information with that ob44[1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7186, 7342.
45

1d.

46

1d. at 7343.
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tained from the Secretary of Commerce, publishing such data under the
East-West Trade Statistics Monitoring System every calendar quarter,
and transmitting that information to the East-West Foreign Trade
Board. East-West trade data includes information on the effect of communist imports on the production of like, or directly competitive, articles in the United States and on employment within the industry which
47
produces similar articles in the United States.
The East-West Foreign Trade Board was established by the Act to
monitor trade transactions in order to insure that East-West trade is in
the national interest of the United States. The Board receives information concerning all transactions with socialist countries involving
technology vital for the United States, and information concerning any
credits, guarantees or insurance provided by a U.S. agency to a communist country amounting to more than five million dollars in any year.
The Board submits to the Congress quarterly reports on East-West
transactions, including detailed information regarding the progress of
trade and the progress of trade agreement negotiations with the communist countries.
Market disruption procedures under Section 406 generally follow
procedures designed for similar situations arising in connection with
imports from market economy countries (Section 201 of the Trade
Act). 48 However, there are some modifications.
Section 406 applies to imports from all communist countries, including Poland and Yugoslavia. Upon a petition by a trade association,
firm, union or group of workers, upon a request by the President or the
Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, upon resolution by the
appropriate House or Senate Committee (Ways an'd Means, or Finance),
upon a petition filed by a traditional supplier (whether an American or
foreign-owned corporation), 4 9 or upon its own motion, the International Trade Commission may launch an investigation to determine
whether market disruption exists due to imports from any communist
country. In the case of non-communist imports the determination must
be made within six months, whereas in the case of a Section 406 investigation, that time limit is reduced to three months. If the Commission
reaches a finding of market disruption, its report must recommend a
tariff rate increase or an import restriction (quota) to remedy the situation.
There are two principal departures from the general rules of Section
201. In the case of imports from market countries, import restrictions are
directed against imports of offensive commodities rather than against
4719 U.S.C. § 2440 (1970).
4819

49

U.S.C. § 2251 (Supp. V 1975).

While § 406(a)(1) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2436) refers only to domestic industry
groups as having the right to petition for an investigation, it can be inferred from the
Senate Finance Report (note 46 supra) that traditional suppliers may petition even if
foreign owned.
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imports from offensive countries. In the case of imports from communist countries, import restrictions are directed against the individual
exporting country. Moreover, in the case of communist imports the
President may take emergency action under Sections 202 and 203 to
restrict imports, even before receiving the determination of the International Trade Commission.
In any situation the President may initiate consultation with the
communist trade partner to provide for an orderly resolution of the
trade distortions, either on petition from the interested party or on his
own motion.
The 1974 Trade Act (Title IV) is an interesting piece of legislation. It
was adopted not only to provide an orderly basis for East-West
economic cooperation, but also to give the Administration the leverage
to achieve political objectives. As in previous East-West trade legislation, economic interests were combined with political aims. The spirit of
the Act was well summarized in the Senate Finance Committee Report:
The Committee recognizes that segments of the private sector wish
the U.S. Government to provide credits, investment guarantees,
protection of private property rights, and other conditions before
private capital investments are ventured. The Committee believes it
is equally reasonable to establish conditions on all basic human
rights, including the right to emigrate as well as basic property
rights, before extending broad concessions to communist countries. so

s[19741 U.S. CODE CONG. & AO. NEWS 7186, 7338.

